

Knowledge, Power and Freedom: Case of the Albanian Society _____

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Abstract

At the core of this article are three key concepts: knowledge, power, and freedom. The backwardness of Albanian society, compared to other developed European societies, has urged me to seek and understand how the relationship of Albanian society with these three concepts stands. For a society, it is essential in which concepts it raises its existence and vision, and how much it respects those concepts. Although the everyday life of people of a society has to do with the practical side, it is difficult to find a developed society that does not initially embody the theories and concepts upon which it has chosen its own existence. The way we understand concepts determines how we respect those concepts. For this reason, it is important to understand how Albanian society conceives the concepts of knowledge, power and freedom, how it interacts with these concepts, and how these concepts relate to each other in Albanian society. This article uses qualitative methods, mainly a review of the literature of Foucault, Kant, Lyotard and Heidegger that relates to the concepts of knowledge, power and freedom, using these concepts to understand how the relation of Albanian society with such concepts is.

Key words: *knowledge, power, Foucault, freedom, philosophy, Albania*

Introduction

This aim of this article is to understand how the concepts of knowledge, power and freedom stand in a certain context, such as Albanian society. The concepts of

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knowledge and power in this paper have Foucauldian meaning. Knowledge does not only mean formal knowledge that can be produced by defined methods in scientific institutions, but the whole range of knowledge that can be produced by any agent or institution in society. Knowledge can be produced in different ways. Knowledge produces power and power can produce knowledge (Foucault, 2009). This means that what I'm doing through this paper is *nolens volens* not only a production of knowledge, but also an exercise of power, however small it may be. It is difficult to prove what Foucault claimed, that any discourse produces power, but I do agree that discourses produce power. One can say that there are powers which are not produced at all by discourses, but by force. Actually, there are several definitions concerning the term "power", which differ from one another. As I mentioned above, in this paper the concept "power" has Foucauldian meaning. *Tipari i veçantë i pushtetit qëndron në faktin se disa njerëz mund të përcaktojnë në mënyrë pak a shumë të plotë sjelljen e njerëzve të tjerë – pak a shumë, porse kurrë krejtësisht dhe as nëpërmjet forcës. Njeriu i rrahur e i lidhur me pranga i nënshtrohet, sigurisht, forcës që ushtrohet mbi të. Forcës, por jo pushtetit.* [The special feature of power lies in the fact that some people can more or less fully determine the behaviour of other people - more or less, but never completely or even by force. The beaten and chained human is, of course, subject to the force exerted upon him/her. Force, but not power.] (Foucault, 2009, p. 157). Another feature of power is that it is found everywhere because power may be produced at any time, at any point within each relationship. Power relationships can be seen as a net, where points from where power is exercised can be anywhere, and points over which power is exercised can also be anywhere. As Foucault said, *pushteti është kudo... sepse vjen prej gjithandej* [power is everywhere... because it comes from anywhere] (Foucault, 2011, p. 123). Freedom on the other hand is important for the relationship that society creates with the power.

Knowledge in the Albanian Society

I do not undertake to regard the relation of the Albanian society with power, knowledge and freedom as special or unique, nor to generalize it to other societies and cultures. Maybe societies with similar characteristics produce similar relations with these concepts. This may be caused because when the discourse gets institutionalized in society, it produces truths for whole society and each truth is accompanied with power. According to Foucault (2009), in any society the multiple relations of power permeate, penetrate, characterize and shape the social corps. As such, they cannot be separated, neither to take place, nor to function without production, accumulation, circulation and functioning of a discourse with truth's

allegation. There is no functioning of power without a certain economy of true discourses, which operate within this power, launched by it and through it. Power cannot be exercised, except by producing its own verity or truths. These truths can be produced by individuals or institutions. The following is a passage from Foucault that shows human's relationship to knowledge and power.

Njeriu është njëherësh objekt dhe subjekt i dijes, ose më saktësisht: njeriu është një subjekt, i cili, subjektin e vet e merr si objekt të dijes.... Pushteti ushtrohet mbi njeriun si objekt... vetëm përsa arrin ta prodhojë atë si subjekt. [The human is at the same time, both, subject and object to knowledge, or more precisely: the human is a subject, who takes her/his own subject as the object of knowledge.... Power is exercised over human as object... as far as it can produce him/her as subject.] (Foucault, 2011, p. 17).

A typical element which can be easily noted in the Albanian society, in its relation with knowledge, is that “everyone knows everything”. I need to clarify that, when I talk about the Albanian society and its relation with knowledge, I mean the society in general, let alone the exemptions which certainly exist. This is easily ascertainable. For instance, suffice to go out on the street and ask people, e.g. about politics or international relation. It is likely to not receive any answer “I do not know”. Almost all respond by claiming that they know the answer of the question you are asking about. If this example it seems not enough, insignificant, or just accidental, let's switch on the TV. There are the same persons who, every evening, discuss in TV studios about all sorts of topics. These people “twig” about politics, economy, sport, astronomy, criminology, diplomacy, fashion, gastronomy, sex, medicine, literature etc. Apparently, no one refuses the invitation to appear on television or in any other possible media or public space to talk. The point is that everyone denies saying “I do not know!”.

Actually, if in TV studios would be invited and appeared only persons who officially represent the power (the government bodies), probably the society could easily create an impression that the media agenda is dictated by the power. Consequently, the media would lose credibility. To avoid or prevent this situation, on TV studios and other conventional media, appear those who are known as analysts. These analysts claim to be independent and to some extent represent the public opinion, public concern, public voice, or public interest. Moreover, these analysts are almost the same persons everywhere on media and they are in total less than a dozen people. Often, they indirectly protect the interests of a power body, such as a political party, a business firm, etc., under the “guise” of someone not officially related. In the best case, if we take for granted their independence and impartiality, they still harm the representation of public interest and the

creation of public opinion. Talking and writing about every topic, they pretend to be omniscient and thus most of their analyses are weak and ordinary. In this way, they contribute in misinformation or malformation of public opinion. In fact, the main problem here stands elsewhere. Because they are the same small group of people who appear everywhere in the media as the representatives of the public voice, in this way they make the privatization of the public discourse. The public interest can be privatized through the privatization of its voice. The privatization of the public discourse by a small group of people may make this discourse no longer protect the public interest but some specific private interest. So, the privatization of the public voice in the media happens in the name of the protection of public interest.

But the aforementioned examples have a reason for their occurrence, which has deeper roots in the Albanian social culture. I bring here another example, which is actually similar to one of the examples I presented above. If one goes out in some city in Albania and asks random people for some directions to get to a certain destination, probably people will try to show it even if they have no idea about it. At any rate, we (the Albanian society) find it very difficult to say “I don’t know!”. This phenomenon is caused because of the nature of relation of the Albanian society with knowledge. It seems that the real relation of the Albanian society is not with knowledge itself, but with the pretension for knowledge. This happens because in this relation of Albanians with knowledge, is embedded what is called “moral”. The relation of knowledge with moral within the Albanian society is conditioned by “shame”. But, we as society, are not ashamed that we do not know, because if we would be ashamed of it, we would try to change it and learn those things for which we are ashamed of. So, we are not ashamed of ourselves, but of others.

Being Kantian means following certain principles, which emerge from our inner consciousness, despite any experience, interest, desire or external condition we may have to the contrary (Centre for the Study of Language and Information, Stanford University, 2016). Behaving according to Kantian ethics means that your action is objectively necessary in itself apart from its relation to a further end. This is what is called “the Categorical Imperative” (Doody, 2014). Considering the shame as an “aKantian” term, we associate it with the external reaction of showing ourselves as ignorant. So, we lie in order to avoid the shame that comes from being ignorant in front of others. We do not consider the fact that the true relation with morality stands in not lying. Indeed, lying to look knowingly is immoral. People on the street answer the question, however, because they are ashamed of looking ignorant, even if it costs a lie. So, in the Albanian society, the relation “citizen - knowledge” is indeed a “citizen – (external) shame - knowledge” relation. Responding to the question asked by another person about “x” direction or place, without knowing the answer, we probably lie her/him by showing the wrong direction. This means

that to avoid any appearance as ignorant, we do an immoral act by lying. In this way, our relation with morality is disingenuous. We associate morality only with the relationship with the external subjects, by excluding ourselves. Not being ashamed of ourselves, we do not consider ourselves subjects but objects without thought and personality. Morality or shame does not exist for us, despite everything we may have done, as long as others are unaware of it. This means that the element of morality between the Albanian society and knowledge stands only in terms of appearance as a moral person, and not being really such. We could be ashamed of anyone except of ourselves.

The importance of being moral in front of others can also be understood by giving another example. In many cases this phenomenon feeds another phenomenon in Albania called “feud”. A significant proportion of murders for blood-taking in Albania are done because if the family cannot take the blood back, it may be ashamed in front of others, in front of the society. The family somehow becomes ashamed for not being able to take back the blood of their murdered family member. The family who does not take back the blood is considered in the surrounding community as a family without honour, immoral, and who does not deserve respect. The family to whom the member was murdered, may not believe in the feud values and may consider unjust the blood-taking. They may forgive the other family for the murder of their family member, but to avoid being ashamed in front of others and not respected by the society, the family is somehow “forced” to murder in order to take back the blood, and to restore the family honour and moral.

Freedom as a Characteristic of Human

It is important to note that the aforementioned phenomena may derive from the fact that culturally the Albanian society is not a free society yet. Freedom in general has been often considered that kind of freedom which suits more to the animal nature than human nature. If for the other creatures on earth, freedom is the possibility of survival or blooming everywhere, the meaning of freedom for humans is something else, much more than that. The human freedom is not merely the possibility of fulfilling her/his own desires, because desires may be appetites, and appetites are determined. What is determined, is defined, and therefore cannot be essentially free. The human freedom is precisely to overcome determination, which means to overcome desires and appetites. Appetites can be biological desires or needs. The desire to be well fed, to have sex, to have a comfortable life full of pleasures and joy are the same desires that any animal may have. But human freedom cannot be compared or equalled with freedom of other creatures such as animals.

The human is free when s/he asks and acts beyond her/his own desires (appetites), even when these acts may counter her/his own appetites. The human is an active being in the world because s/he is free. The human is a world-maker. The human makes the world even by denying herself/himself, society, nature, etc. When a human has nothing more to deny, s/he equates herself/himself. As the result of two different essential characteristics of freedom that the animal and the human have, or rather the non-freedom of animal and the freedom of human, animal adapts to the world, whilst human makes the world. The animal is passive in the world; the human is active in the world. Consequently, the more a person adapts to the world, the less “subject” s/he is.

Using the terms of Heidegger, the categorization of *non-living things*, *living beings* and *humans*, is as follow: The *inanimate* is the stone which is non-world (Weltloss); stone is in the world but does not enter into relationship with the world, so the world does not exist for it. *Alive* is the animal who is in the world but s/he is almost non-world or poor-world (Weltarm). The animal is enclosed within instincts and redeemers in the world. While *the human* is in the world, enters into relationship with the world and makes the world. Human goes out into the world and takes the world inside herself/himself. Hence, there is the world of the human in the world. (Feraj, 2011).

Because the human is a being with thoughts and does not act just instinctively, we could see him/her as a project in the world; as the project to realize herself/himself and the world; as a project that makes history and does not only fits to history. For a human to be, s/he must be “free” according to the concept of freedom I presented above. The human cannot fulfil this concept of freedom without the denialism of herself/himself. So, to be free is the ability, the courage, the willingness to say “no” when needed and to act accordingly. The human says “no” (denies) to the nature, objects and subjects that surround her/him; says “no” to different political and economic systems; and can go so far as to deny herself/himself, which means the suicide. An animal cannot deny herself/himself and commit suicide. Even the scorpions, who allegedly commits suicide, do not do such a thing because they are immune to their own venom (Cobb 2010). Animals cannot make hunger strikes or commit suicide because they do not negate themselves, because the denial of the self is an action that goes beyond the freedom nature of the animals.

The human, as *modus* is not defined only with the unification and connection of a spirit with a body, whose idea s/he is, but also with the power of expression and production that constitutes this modification. So, a human from another human differs through the power with which s/he develops the forms of her/his own expression of actions and thoughts; with the ways of experiencing the phenomena of nature and society; and with the way how s/he expresses what her/his body and mind experience. (Kullashi, 2005).

The Power-Knowledge relation

The relation of a society with knowledge implies in this relationship another concept, which is “the power”. Focusing on the power, referring to Foucault, there are two different theories on how people conceive the power.

According to him, the first theory is the classic legal theory. This theory says: *Pushteti është diçka konkrete që çdo individ e zotëron dhe të cilin ai e jep në një çast të caktuar, të tërin ose pjesërisht, duke ndërtuar kështu pushtetin, ose sovranitetin politik.* [The power is something concrete that every individual possesses and which s/he gives it in a certain moment, fully or partially, building in this way the power, or the political sovereignty.] The second theory is the general Marxist conception of power or as we might call it otherwise the “economic functionality” of power. *Roli i pushtetit është, në thelb, sa ruajtja e raporteve të prodhimit, aq dhe riprodhimi i sundimit klasor, i cili bëhet i mundur pikërisht në sajë të zhvillimit dhe të modaliteteve të shfrytëzimit të forcave prodhuese.* [The role of power is, in essence, the preservation of production reports as well as the reproduction of class rule, which is made possible precisely thanks to the development and modalities of the use of productive forces.] (Foucault 2009: 86-87). Apparently, in the most eastern European societies, the second definition of power seems more acceptable, more compatible, and much closer to the reality. Mainly, in totalitarian societies, but also in autocratic or semi-democratic societies, it seems that power follows more or less the same logic. To illustrate it, I bring below another example from the Republic of Albania during the period of communist regime of 1945-1991. At that time, the Political Party which was in power and the only, “knew” everything, and so it became a common expression in society “the party knows it” for any issues discussed.

Seeing from the perspective of Lyotard, I can say that the narrative of the Labour Party of Albania was the absolute meta-narrative in the society at that period (1945-1991). When I say it was the absolute meta-narrative, I do not mean that it was the absolute narrative. I mean that it was absolutely the prevalent narrative but not the only. According to Lyotard, meta-narrative does not eradicate completely the micro-narrative, but the micro-narrative, from a serious, alternative and threatening narrative, repeals and returns to the reflective of the brilliance of the meta-narrative. Consequently, the micro-narrative turns to non-threatening, not serious and somewhat amusing (Lyotard, 2011). This was precisely what happened in Albania during the 1945-1990 period. There were micro-narratives in the society, but they did not pose a threat to the meta-narrative, on the contrary, they mostly were necessary for the existence of the meta-narrative. The micro-narratives that threaten the power, got eliminated. To illustrate it, I can give here another example from Albania at that time. Everywhere in the country were allowed to live some

few families who more or less did not agree with the communist system and the power, or somehow opposed it. These families were known in public with the term “kulak”. Originally, kulak means *a peasant in Russia wealthy enough to own a farm and hire labour. Emerging after the emancipation of serfs in the 19th century the kulaks resisted Stalin’s forced collectivization, but millions were arrested, exiled, or killed* (Lexico, Oxford University). The same process happened in Albania. But some few “kulaks” were allowed to keep some of their own properties, the products of which were not enough to afford a normal life. Despite that the (party) state allowed them “to be”, these families lived in a deep poverty that indirectly showed the greatness of the power and the consequences of those who did not obey and act according to the party. So, the micro-narrative was allowed as far as it did not threaten the power, but on the contrary, showed its greatness.

Another example are the fictive elections during the dictatorship regime in Albania and maybe in other dictatorship countries. In every (fictive) electoral process, in the announcement of the election results by the state, the voting results were always around 99% pro the ruling party. There was always around 1% against. That one percent who was against (most likely, at the ballot box might not be found even a single vote against) were necessary for the power. Even if they didn’t exist, they must be created. That one percent is the micro-narrative. For any eventual problems or threats that might arise, for any unpleasant suddenness that might appears, the enemy was found or invented, and this enemy was represented by that one percent of votes in the elections who were against the party and consequently the country. So, the meta-narrative of the power, even when it could wipe out any micro-narrative, did not do it because did not need such an action. On the contrary, it could damage it. The micro-narratives were allowed as long as they were not threatening, but they just served, indirectly and inadvertently, to the meta-narrative.

We can note a similar logic of the power even if we refer to Foucault as well, in his book “*Historia e Seksualitetit 1*”. He exemplifies the exercise of power through the discourse about sex. According to him, *që nga shekulli XVIII seksi s’ka reshtur së nxituri një shumëfishim të përgjithshëm ligjërimor. Dhe gjithë këto ligjërime mbi seksin nuk janë zhvilluar jashtë fushës së pushtetit e as kundër tij; përkundrazi, në vatrën e ushtrimit të tij dhe si mjet i këtij ushtrimi.* [Since the eighteenth century, sex has not stopped stimulating a general diversification of discourses. And all these discourses about sex are not developed beyond the scope of power, nor against it; on the contrary, in the hearth of its exertion and as a tool of this exertion.] (Foucault, 2011, p. 61).

So, the meta-narrative includes within itself and in its service the narrative about sex as well. The power expands its own control branches through the discourses of sex because the society is very sensitive when sex is the matter of the discourse. The power needs to modify its discourses (meta-narrative) occasionally because

discourses, as much as silences, are not subjects of power once and for all, nor directed against it.

Ligjërimi mund të bëhet njëherazi mjet dhe efekt i pushtetit, por po aq pengesë, digë, thep qëndrese dhe pikënisje e një strategjie të kundërt. Ligjërimi përçon dhe prodhon pushtet; mund ta përforcojë atë, por, po ashtu, mund ta minojë, ta zhveshë, ta dobësojë dhe t'i presë rrugën. Po ashtu, heshtja dhe sekretet mund të strehojnë pushtetin, të rrenjosin ndalimet e tij; por po aq mund t'i shprishin zaptimet dhe të sigurojnë zona pak a shumë të errëta tolerimi. [The discourse may become simultaneously the tool and the effect of the power, but the same an obstacle, a barrier, a resistance bead, and a starting point of a contrary strategy. The discourse conveys and produces power; it may strengthen it, but also can undermine, divest, weaken and break off its road. Also, the silence and secrecy can shelter the power, instil its prohibitions; but equally could touse its conquests and secure, more or less, dark areas of tolerance.] (Foucault, 2011, p. 131).

Concerning the “righteousness” and “justice” in Albania, which except any contextual explanation that we could do, seem to stay very good on the “couch” that Foucault has created. I believe that the following approach of Foucault describes properly how the power understands “righteousness” as a concept, and “justice” as a system in Albania, but not only.

Qysh nga Mesjeta, roli thelbësor i teorisë së të drejtës është fiksimi dhe përcaktimi i legjitimitetit të pushtetit... Funkzioni kryesor i ligjëritimit dhe teknikës së të drejtës ka qenë shkrirja, ose tretja e faktit të sundimit (domination) në gjirin e pushtetit, reduktimi dhe maskimi i këtij fakti, për të nxjerrë në pah, në vend të tij, dy gjëra: nga njëra anë, të drejtat legjitime të sovranitetit dhe, nga ana tjetër, detyrimin legal për t'iu bindur atyre... E drejta... përcjell dhe vë në veprim forma marrëdhëniesh që nuk janë vetëm marrëdhënie sovraniteti, porse edhe marrëdhënie sundimi. [Since the middle ages, the essential role of the theory of the righteousness is the fixation and determination of the legitimacy of power... The main function of narrative and the technique of righteousness has been to melt or to digest the fact of domination within the power gulf, the reduction and the camouflage of this fact, to highlight, in its place, two things: on the one hand, the legitimate rights of sovereignty and, on the other hand, the legal obligation to obey them.... The righteousness... forwards and actuates forms of relationship which are not only sovereignty relations, but also the relations of domination.] (Foucault, 2009, pp. 98-99).

Referring to Foucault, *subjugated knowledges* are those knowledges that power has to make silent, in order that its own discourse to be prevalent in society as long as possible. According to him, with *subjugated knowledges* we understand two things. First, there are those kinds of buried historical knowledges, camouflaged under

functional coherence or under formal systematization. They are historical knowledge blocks, which were as present as kept hidden within the functional and systematic complexes, knowledge blocks that the criticism reached to highlight, of course only through erudite work. Second, there is a whole lot of knowledges, which are usually excluded or disqualified as non-conceptual knowledge, knowledge of insufficiently processed, classified as naive knowledge, low on the hierarchy level, knowledges that are developed and articulated under the level required by scientific knowledge, etc. (Foucault, 2009). There were exactly these two kinds of knowledges which were subdued and suppressed by the power in Albania during the period of communist regime 1945-1991. Erudite knowledge encompassed these two kinds of knowledge within its own meta-narrative, using them in its own function. The erudite work turned completely into the service of the power, in the service of the prevailing discourse. "The truths" were set by the party and scientists had only one task: to prove or justify them. The education sector fully underwent to power and its own propaganda. In totalitarian societies, the education sector is subjugated by power and its propaganda, while in democratic societies, the education sector is influenced or shaped by the power or system. Of course, the level of subordination of the education sector by the power in totalitarian societies cannot be compared with the level of influence of the education sector by the power in democratic societies. For instance, in the communist totalitarian countries, schools propagated communism, socialism, class society etc. Schools in the capitalist countries mostly propagate the democratic values, values of capitalism, free market, private property, etc.

During the communist period, education in Albania was used as an instrument of propaganda by the state-party, supporting the ruling class and promoting the Marxism-Leninism ideology. After 1991, when Albania started its democratization process, this feature of education as an instrument of propaganda, became weaker. In democratic systems, the power cannot have much control over the education system, especially over the university, therefore cannot directly use it for propagandistic purposes. In this respect, the power is more interested in keeping universities silent in producing the truths which may question or shake the truths of the power. So, the best propaganda for the power, is the silence of the university.

By propagating a certain form of system or governance, they propagate in the service of the power who leads the system. This kind of education system seems best explained by Foucault in his inaugural lecture held at College de France in 1970, summarized in his book *L'ordre de discours, 2 Lectures form Puissance et connaissances, Omnes et Singulatim*, translated into Albanian as *Pushteti dhe Dija*:

Çdo sistem edukimi është një mënyrë politike për të mbajtur ose ndryshuar përvetësimin e ligjërimeve, me dijet dhe pushtetet që bartin në vete. ... Tek e fundit, ç'mund të jetë tjetër një sistem arsimimi në mos një ritualizim i fjalës, një cilësim dhe ngulitje e roleve

për subjektet folëse, themelim i një grupi doktrinar së paku i përhapur, shpërndarje dhe përvetësim i ligjërimet së bashku me pushtetet dhe dijet e tij? [Every system of education is a political way to keep or to change the acquisition of discourses, with the knowledge and powers they carry within themselves. ... After all, what else can be an education system if it is not a ritualism of word, a specification and inculcation of the roles for the speaking subjects, the foundation of a less widespread doctrinal group, the distribution and acquisition of the discourse along with its own powers and knowledges?] (Foucault, 2009, p. 47).

The disqualified discourses and knowledge, which circulated in the Albanian society in the period 1945-1990, were also suppressed to the point that were not a threat to the power and had no strength to set against it. Any discourse, even unqualified, which circulated in the Albanian society and conflicted with the system, or more specifically with the power, got destroyed or disappeared (often not fully) immediately. The pressing or swallowing of these two knowledges or discourses by the prevailing discourse, allows the latter to be so as long as this *status quo* does not change. The activation of these subjugation knowledges abrogates the tyranny of the global and comprehensive discourses, along with all their hierarchies and privileges of theoretical vanguards. The combination, seemingly paradoxical, of sunken knowledge of the erudite with unauthorized knowledge from the hierarchy of scientific cognition is the yardstick which gives the decisive force to the discourses' criticism. (Foucault, 2009).

One of the apparatuses of power exercise, that has recently begun to operate in Albania, because in many other countries has been functioning since a long time, is the use of psychoanalysis. It seems that psychoanalysis is perhaps one of the best disciplines captured by power and put into its own service. *Psikanaliza është: teknikë mjekimi, teknikë korrigjimi dhe diapozitiv vërtetësimi.* [Psychoanalysis is: treatment technique, correction technique and authentication diapositive.] (Foucault, 2011, p. 20). The psychoanalyst is the one where people with life dissatisfaction, confess and huff their problems. It is a good way of diverting the huff of social discontent, from power to the psychoanalyst. People, after they have talked and huffed to the psychoanalyst, feel calmer and more relaxed, and have less rancour to react or inveigh against the power. In addition, they also receive pleasure from the confession. It is the satisfaction that comes from the truth of pleasure, from knowledge, from disclosure, from its discovery, from the glamour as we bring it out in the light, from the interest of others to it which enables our impact on them; pleasure from saying, from the expression of it, from the affirmation in the confidential form, from the triumph when we entrap it: the satisfaction of a special type, which gives us the true discourse on pleasure (Foucault, 2011).

On the other hand, through psychoanalysis, the power not only builds a

canal to huff the rancour, the discontent, the hatred, the energy of people, but also creates a disciplinary institution. From the discontent citizens to deviants, delinquents and criminals, after huffing to the psychoanalyst, they take advices from the psychoanalyst on how to be calm, quiet and patient in accordance with the norms and laws. So, more or less, what the power wants is imposing of its own norms through the laws and psychoanalysts, and keeping of the discontent people in composure. Let's make noise just at the psychoanalyst. By doing this, the power also guides the desires of its people. S/he who hears is not just the owner of the right of pardon, or the judge who declares us innocent or guilty; s/he must be the owner of the truth. Psychoanalysis (Freud's and Lacan's) says that the law is also the structurer of desires, and formative of the subject (Foucault, 2011). Assertion-confession of the truth thrusts into the heart of procedures of individualism through the power. *Perëndimi e bëri rrëfimin një nga teknikat më të vlerësuar për prodhimin e së vërtetës. Qysh nga kjo kohë, shoqëria perëndimore është shndërruar në shoqëri të pazakontë rrëfimesh.* [The Western made the confession one of the most appreciated techniques for the production of truth. Since that time, the Western society has become an unusual society of confessions.] (Foucault, 2011, p. 88).

According to Foucault (2011), the era of oppression begins in the XVII century, the feature of bourgeois societies, and from which, perhaps, we are not yet fully liberated. It seems that to achieve the control of reality, discourses had to be controlled. Although Europe had about three centuries that used this control of discourses, in Albania seems that the power began to use this technique of exertion in the first half of the 20th century, with the coming to power of King Zog. The power began to subjugate the discourses, and where it failed to do so, it exerted its domination by physically eliminating the owners of the discourses.

In fact, despite the differences of ages and objectives, the image of the power still has remained drowned from the shade of monarchy. In the space of political thought and analysis, "the head of the king" is not cut yet. This explains the great importance that continues to be given within the theory of power, to the problem of righteousness and violence, to the law and illegality, to the will and freedom and, above all, to the problem of the state and sovereignty, although the sovereignty does not refer anymore to a person who leads, but mostly to a collective entity (Foucault, 2011).

Oppressive, controller and supervisory features of the power in Albania during the communist era 1945-1991 – but also after '90s, in addition to the implementation of a communist dictatorial system, were also, but not only, attributes of the continuation of the power that was appeared, or rather was invented, in Europe over the XVII-XVIII centuries, which Foucault would call it *the disciplinary power*. This type of power gets exerted continually through surveillance and not occasionally through the systems of taxation, collection and

other chronically obligations. This disciplinary power implies a fine and material control of space and time (Foucault, 2009). Another characteristic of the power until a few years ago, not only in Albania, but almost all in over the world, was also the death penalty known as the capital punishment. Long, the right of life and death has been one of the characteristic privileges of the sovereign power. From this perspective, the right of life and death does not appear as an absolute privilege, but conditioned by the sovereign protection and its survival insurance. “The right” named as the right of “life and death”, in fact, it is the right to *give* death or to *leave* life. However, despite nowadays that the death penalty is abolished in many countries, the power continues to have the features of the sovereign power. The sovereign power has already changed its way of exercise but not its logic. The right of death begins in this way to dislodge or to start relying on the new requirements of the power, which takes the life in administration, and to respond to the power requirements. Sovereignty, presented now as a necessary complementary element of a more essential power, which is exercised over the life positively, takes in charge its management, its growth and its multiplications, exercises on it the precise controls and global adjustments. From the moment when the power gives itself the functions of life administration, what makes much more difficult the implementation of the death penalty is not the birth of humanitarian feelings, but the necessary reason of the power and its exercise logic. So, we can say that the old right to *give* the death or to *leave* the life is replaced by the power which *grows* the life or *let* you dying. This is the bio-power, which was one of the ways of the power exercise in Albania during the communist totalitarian period, and is also a way of power exertion in capitalism. Body disciplines and population adjustments are the two poles around which the organization of power over the life unfolds. According to Foucault (2011), there is no doubt that the bio-power has been one of the necessary elements of the development of capitalism, which could not ensure its sustainable growth and expansion without the controlled insertion of troops into the production apparatus, and without the adjustment of the population phenomena with economic processes.

Findings

Power relationships can be seen as a net, where points from where power is exercised and over which is exercised can be anywhere. Knowledge defines in some way how powers are exercised in a society. The human is at the same time, both, subject and object to knowledge, and consequently to power. In the relationship of Albanian society with knowledge, one can easily notice the fact that everyone denies saying “I do not know!”. The relation of knowledge with moral within the

Albanian society is conditioned by “shame”. But, we as society, are not ashamed that we do not know, because if we would be ashamed of it, we would try to change it and learn those things for which we are ashamed of. So, we are not ashamed of ourselves, but of others. We associate morality only with the relationship with the external subjects, by excluding ourselves. Not being ashamed of ourselves, we do not consider ourselves subjects but objects without thought. The element of morality between the Albanian society and knowledge stands only in terms of appearance as a moral person, and not being really such. We could be ashamed of anyone except of ourselves.

The privatization of the public discourse by a small group of people may make this discourse no longer protect the public interest but some specific private interest. So, the privatization of the public voice in the Albanian media happens in the name of the protection of public interest.

Human freedom is not merely the possibility of fulfilling her/his own desires, because desires may be appetites, and appetites are determined. What is determined, is defined, and therefore cannot be essentially free. Human freedom is precisely to overcome determination, which means to overcome desires and appetites. The human is free when s/he asks and acts beyond her/his own desires (appetites), even when these acts may counter her/his own appetites. The human cannot fulfil the concept of freedom without the denialism of herself/himself. The human is free as far as s/he can deny herself/himself and be a world-maker.

The micro-narrative, during the communist era (1945-1991) in Albania, was allowed as far as it did not threaten the meta-narrative, which was represented by the power, but on the contrary, showed its greatness. During the communist era, the erudite work in Albania turned completely into the service of the power, in the service of the prevailing discourse. “The truths” were set by the party and scientists had only one task: to prove or justify them. The disqualified discourses and knowledge, which circulated in the Albanian society in the period 1945-1990, were also suppressed to the point that were not a threat to the power and had no strength to set against it.

In democratic systems, the power cannot have much control over the education system, especially over the university, therefore cannot directly use it for propagandistic purposes. In this respect, the power is more interested in keeping universities silent in producing the truths which may question or shake the truths of the power. So, the best propaganda for the power, is the silence of the university.

The law is the conditioner of actions, but over time it becomes the structurer of desires as well. What the power had installed in Albania before the communist regime, got strengthened during the communist regime, and continued its influence in the post-communist era. This was a combination of the disciplinary power - which had already knocked with delay in the backward countries of Europe - with

the sovereign power and the bio-power. These types of power exercises continue also nowadays to be applied - but of course in different ways - to almost all capitalist countries. But, regardless of the way it is exercised or functioned, which in dictatorial regimes is different, the exercise of power still operates under the same logic.

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