“Veriphobia” and process: after all, we must still be old-fashioned purists

By, MSc. Gabriel RIGUETTI

Abstract

The main objective of this critical review is to evaluate how the concept of truth is interpreted and used by procedural doctrine. As a rule, based on common sense, legal authors mistakenly use the expression, which causes a phenomenon called Veriphobia. Seeking the contribution of epistemic concepts, in which the expression of truth has a character of mere propositional value, we will seek to give a new function of rationality to the term in the process. It is possible, from the link between a supposed “sick ambition for the truth” and violations of citizens’ guarantees and rights – as if the latter were a necessary prerequisite for achieving the former – to find the most varied examples that demonstrate the inconsistency of existing terms and concepts in the debate. I will face, fundamentally due to the limitation of the present study, only two of them, however, the adopted logic can be transferred to the others without major damages. The objective, in fact, will be to demonstrate that, despite the legitimate concerns with procedural formalities and guarantees, the idea of searching for the truth seems quite distorted by its opponents.

How to cite: Riguetti, G. (2023). “Veriphobia” and process: After all, we must still be old-fashioned purists. Jus & Justicia, 17(1), 107–117.

https://doi.org/10.58944/jjsv9652